ALT HX #2: without Buford
I’d speculate that we could very easily be describing the Battle of Pipe’s Creek that took place in the first week of July 1863 as an Alternative History to the Battle of Gettysburg. This could easily be the history of the USA if BG Buford had done just his job — instead of more than his job!
Buford had been dispatched to locate and fix the position of Lee’s Army. He essentially accomplished that task when he spied the party of scavengers moving west from Gettysburg. WHATIF he had simply returned to camp and made his report to LTG Reynolds instead of concocting the ambush.
Had Buford not been blocking the way on July first, Heth’s division would have marched for a few hours and established a bridgehead at the north end of the Baltimore Pike. Over the course of the day, the rest of Hill’s Corps would have encamped in the area of Culp’s Hill. Late in the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps would have arrived from the north. Longstreet was still the better part of a day’s march to the west.
Still not exactly sure where Meade’s Army was located, Lee would likely have sent Hill down the Pike and Ewell south on the Emmittsburg Road, running roughly parallel to it. This could have happened on July 2 or Lee could have waited for Longstreet to consolidate his force at Gettysburg before proceeding on 3 July.
The bluff overlooking Pipe’s Creek where Hooker had decided to make his stand blocking the Baltimore Pike, is roughly 14 miles south of Gettysburg. Emmittsburg where LTG Reynolds was encamped with four Union Corps is only 10 miles SW of Gettysburg. Meade would have recalled his easternmost Corps as Early abandoned his march to Harrisburg. He would have been waiting near Taneytown with three Union Corps.
Exactly where the first clash would have occurred would have depended on the time of departure and the rate of march of Hill and Ewell’s Corps. It’s quite likely that two battles would be been fought almost simultaneously only a few miles apart.
Part 1: The Battle of Emmittsburg 2–3 July 1863
Ewell’s departure from the Carlisle area would likely have been reported by telegraph to Meade, who would have alerted Reynolds to deploy into a defensive line near Emmittsburg. He had command of three Unions Corps: First, Third and Eleventh. Of those, the Eleventh was the least reliable and possibly would have been held in reserve. With two Union Corps online, that force would still have been slightly outnumbered by Ewell’s attacking force. So it is more than likely that after the initial meeting engagement, Ewell would have broken contact and pulled back to await Lee’s orders. But Lee had a surprise waiting. Historically, we know that J.E.B. Stuart returned from his own personal military tour of Maryland and Pennsylvania on the night of 2 July.
Ewell most likely would have attacked in force on 3 July, and with Stuart’s Cavalry galloping into action in support of the infantry, it is highly likely that Reynolds’ defense would have broken and have had to withdraw towards Pipe’s Creek. Such a plan had been disseminated by Hooker just before he was relieved and replaced by Meade.
Part 2: The Battle of Pipe’s Creek 2–3 July 1863
Meade would have had a strong defensive position near Taneytown. But with only three Union Corps, he would have been outnumbered slightly by Hill’s Corps. In much the same way that the Union had prevailed at Fredericksburg VA, Heth’s division would have swung around to attack Meade’s right flank. Fear of that side being rolled up would have caused Meade to break contact and withdraw by the end of day.
The next major crossroads town to the south for Meade would be Westminster MD. He would have needed to stop and defend near there to allow Reynold’s to rejoin him. This meant occupying the hills on the south side of Pipe’s Creek. There is a direct road leading from Emmittsburg to Taneytown but with Hill near Taneytown, Reynolds would have had to stay to the west and had a much longer march towards Pipe Creek. From Westminster to downtown Baltimore is barely 25 miles! Meade would have been desperate to consolidate and hold a line at the creek. Reynolds would likely have held his left flank in the area of Middleburg MD.
Using the direct connection from Emmittsburg to Taneytown, Ewell could have quickly consolidated with Hill. Longstreet would have taken Ewell’s place on the Confederate right flank at Emmittsburg and then continued south to harass Reynolds’ retreat.
At this point, the variables become much too numerous to predict the maneuvers over the succeeding days. Would Lee be content with having pushed Meade into a desperate situation only a day’s march north of Baltimore? Would Meade’s weeklong tenure as the commander of the Army of the Potomac come to an abrupt end? Would the Union army rally around their new Commander, GEN Reynolds? Could Reynolds hold Lee at Westminster until Lee’s supply and re-enforcement situation became critical? After all Lee was operating in hostile territory. Would Lincoln have allowed any of the five Corps that were still guarding WASH DC to be shifted north to re-enforce Reynolds?
The worst possible outcome of this Alternative History (for the Union) would have been that Lee’s political goal of bringing a weakened Lincoln to the negotiating table would have accomplished. Lee could have slipped back to the west using Emmittsburg as his rear guard and retraced his entry path back to the Potomac.
