ALT Hx #3: Lee moves south

This next essay explores alternative scenarios as Lee moves to find the Union force and attack it.

I write these in a stream-of-consciousness mode. I try to place myself in the mind of the senior commanders and make decisions as the scenario unfolds. As to timelines, I try to stay true to what is factual.

No matter where my cogitating leads, Lee almost always seems to lose; mainly because he cannot sustain a prolonged battle scenario so deep in the north. The only way he seems to be able to overcome that deficit is if he captures Westminster. This is the scenario that NEWT GINGRICH uses in his ALT Hx novel.

ALT HX #3a Lee to Pipe Creek

This scenario describes an alternative to prior ALT HX essays as either Buford simply does his job and does not concoct his ambush scheme or Stuart does his job and is in place at Gettysburg to thwart Buford’s advance.

In either case, 1 July 1863 would have developed like this: Heth’s division of Hill’s Corps establishes a beachhead where the BALTO PIKE enters Gettysburg. By noon, Pender’s and Anderson’s divisions have joined up and bivouac along the PIKE to the south of Heth.

By mid-afternoon Rodes and Early of Ewell’s Corps move into position just south of the city in the valley between the Seminary and Cemetery ridges. By nightfall, Johnson’s division is encamped near the Seminary.

There they rest and wait for Longstreet’s Corps to arrive. First Hood then McLaw’s divisions are just south of Cashtown by noon of 2 July.

Lee’s major decision at this point is whether to wait for Pickett’s division to arrive or to advance south with what he has. He decides to move. He launches Hill’s Corps down the road to Taneytown with Anderson in the lead. Ewell’s Corps is dispatched towards Emmittsburg. Longstreet is to take the longer route thru Fairfield before turning to approach Emmittsburg from the west. This is the only place where Lee knows that there are Union forces so he anticipates contact and wants his force concentrated there.

He shifts Stuart’s cavalry over to the BALTO PIKE. When Pickett arrives at Gettysburg, Stuart will move down the PIKE with Pickett in trail after a much needed rest stop.

Anderson approaches cautiously towards Taneytown arriving there in the early afternoon of 2 July, he sends word to Lee that he has yet to encounter any Union troops. Simultaneously, Rodes enters Emmittsburg finding it too is free of any Union soldiers. The two Corps Commanders are still wary of any Union troop movements from the south. So, Ewell stations Early’s division as a blocking force south of Emmittsburg and turns his two other divisions towards Taneytown. Similarly, Hill places Pender’s division facing west blocking the road from Emmittsburg. Anderson and Heth continue their march south towards Westminster. Late in the afternoon, Stuart’s fast moving cavalry arrives at Littlestown and learns that the Union Sixth Corps had just recently passed through there headed south towards Manchester.

Like Gettysburg, Westminster is a cross-roads and rail hub. It has a direct rail link to Baltimore and will undoubtedly be used by the Army of the Potomac as a supply base. It is larger than Gettysburg and the true jewel of all the towns in the area. Surely Meade had plans to defend it. So he must have formed up his Army between Westminster and Taneytown, but where?

Anderson reports back that he has located the Union force. Lee and Hill join him on a hill beside the road leading from Taneytown to Westminster. Through their field glasses they can see Union troops preparing defensive positions along a series of contiguous hills. They also note that there are two other important terrain features: stone bridges for the two main roads to cross what they will soon learn is Pipe’s Creek.

As evening falls on 2 July, Lee has 5 divisions in the vicinity of Taneytown and three near Emmittsburg, with Stuart in Littlestown and Pickett preparing to march through the night to close on him. Lee had Anderson and Heth deploy to the left of the Taneytown Road facing the Union line with about a mile of open land between them.

On the morning of the 3rd of July, Pender deploys as the Rebel’s left flank. As Pender moves out of his blocking position, Rodes and Johnson shift to occupy the hills to the west of the Taneytown Road, next to Hill’s Corps. Early begins his march to join them and Hood and McLaws turn south out of Emmittsburg towards Westminster. Once again, Lee’s plan is to use a flank attack led by Longstreet as his main thrust once he locates the Union line. A quick glance at the available maps tells him that the Union line he can see must stretch from Manchester on the east (the Union right flank) to Middleburg in the west. Longstreet’s approach will take him near Middleburg by the late evening of the third.

ALT HX #3b Meade at Pipe Creek

On the evening of 30 June, having been informed of Buford’s clash with Stuart, Meade decides to implement Hooker’s Pipe Creek Circular and recall his army to form there for the defense of Westminster. Exactly as the situation called for (and Lee predicted), Westminster was now a beehive of activity and a fast growing supply base. Trains were arriving regularly with every type of supply item an army could need and then some! Since it was also less than 20 miles from the northern edge of Baltimore, Westminster had to be defended at all costs.

On the morning of 1 July, Meade has the Fifth and Twelfth Union Corps with him near Union Mills at Pipe Creek. They are busy fortifying the bluffs above the creek astride the BALTO PIKE. Hancock’s Second Corps is moving up from the south and expected about noon. The next closest unit is Sickles’ Third Corps who reversed their march to Emmittsburg to return south. They will move to occupy the Union left flank at Middleburg. Following them will be the Eleventh and First Union Corps who will pass by Taneytown and take up positions astride the Taneytown to Westminster road. By the evening of 1 July, Meade will have a line running about 18 miles in an arc from Manchester to Middleburg and blocking the two main roadway approaches to Westminster. Hancock will bivouac near Frizzelburg as the Union reserve. The Sixth Corps has the longest march back from their shadowing of Early’s march towards York. They do not arrive at their assigned position of the Union right flank at Manchester until the late afternoon of the July second.

Meade’s Chief Engineer (Warren) and Artillery Commander (Hunt) have been hard at work laying out fortifications and fields of fire. The 100,000 man Army of the Potomac is spread out over 18 miles (a far cry from the compact 3 mile front at the real Gettysburg). Plus the bluffs above Pipe Creek, while formidable, are not continuous but rather a series of contiguous hills with lower saddles between them. BG Hunt brings up every cannon he has available and positions them to protect those low areas with well-planned cross fire. The fortified artillery positions are located behind the infantry trenches. They are also well placed to fire on the no-man’s-land north of the creek that any Confederate attack must cross.

At the same time, Hunt has all available artillery ammunition brought forward from Westminster and positioned to the rear of the Union line where it can quickly re-supply the batteries. One other concern, is Sickles’ position at Middleburg. As it approaches the city, the hills on Pipe’s Creek peter out so that the city and the road leading through it into Westminster are on flat ground. Sickles needs to scramble to build ramparts and fortifications to anchor the flank and block that road. He sends BG Birney into Westminster to commandeer wagons, barrels, hay bales and anything else that can be used to fortify the town. Birney returns triumphantly with a wealth of materials but also 3 large siege cannons that had found their way north from Baltimore. These are large and cumbersome to move and slow to fire but they have a range greater than any of the standard artillery. They could ostensibly be used to bombard any approaching force at great distance, slowing if not stopping an attack.

So by sunset of July Second, the Army of the Potomac is in place and reasonably well disposed to guard Westminster. BG Warren, Meade’s Engineering Chief had taken to preemptive step to have a Brigade of Hancock’s reserve division move up and begin to prepare the defensive line that the last arriving Sixth Corps would eventually occupy. In addition, Meade had sent his cavalry north towards Littlestown to protect Sixth Corps’ rear as they moved south. If Lee was moving south, Sixth Corps would be the most vulnerable to an attack while they were still en route.

ALT HX #3c Lee attacks at Pipe Creek

Lee’s evening commander’s conference on the evening of the 3rd of July was a somewhat unusual affair. Lee’s prior command philosophy was to formulate a plan and simply issue orders to his Corps Cdrs (plus Stuart) to carry out. Lee seemingly had a plan in mind but on this night he solicited the input from his 4 senior officers as to how to carry out the next day’s inevitable attack. The ever-impetuous Stuart naturally argued for his cavalry to be allowed to attack Westminster directly; relegating the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia to a supporting role.

But Lee had sent Longstreet’s two divisions towards Manchester for a reason. He had also sent orders striping away as much of his cavalry that had been guarding the vast wagon trains and sending them to join Longstreet as he approached Manchester. Lee’s favorite military tactic was the flank attack and this is just what he had planned for Longstreet to lead. The question at hand was how to employ the other 7 divisions.

Pickett would be held in reserve on the left flank behind Stuart. Two full corps were aligned facing off with the Union fortifications above Pipe Creek. Lee’s scouts had had an opportunity to survey the terrain of the creek and the news was not good for the attacking force. The creek over the eons had cut a gorge ranging from 2–5 yards deep and up to 5–10 yards wide. That creek bed would be a rather formidable obstacle. Beyond the creek, the hills rose steeply and were topped by substantial fortifications. There were, however, gaps between the bluffs that could possibly be exploited. Two of these could be approached using the stone bridges of the main highways, but Meade would surely have these well-covered by artillery.

Depending on conditions, it should take an infantry unit 20–30 minutes to cross the open space to reach the creek. But beyond that they would be faced with a steep climb under intense fire. IOW, was an all-out frontal attack warranted and did it have a chance of success? Could the Union line be broken? Could such an action be exploited? With the Union front opposite his force spanning a good ten miles between the two main roadways, it would not be easy for one corps to support the other. If they attacked, each group of three divisions would be pretty much on their own attacking astride the highways. Likewise, Ewell’s Corps was too far to the north to offer any support to Longstreet’s flank attack. His two divisions would also be isolated. But Lee had anticipated this when he ordered the cavalry forward.

Lee envisioned a series of diversionary attacks while Longstreet was approaching Manchester. He hoped to divert attention from that flank and perhaps even draw forces away to shore up the main Union line under attack. He ordered Longstreet to have Hood launch the attack on Manchester. McLaws meanwhile would slip around behind Hood and approach Westminster from the west. In front of McLaws, the cavalry would attempt a lightning strike into the city. Their main objective would be the rail terminus and the cache of supplies undoubtedly located nearby. They would target any locomotives they found in an effort to disable them and thereby block access for any new trains arriving from the south.

They would also attempt to destroy any ammunition or black powder supplies they encountered. The ensuing explosions and fires were sure to get Meade’s attention. How he reacted would be important in the eventual outcome of the battle — and maybe the war.

Following the cavalry, McLaws would attempt to occupy the northwest sector of Westminster to support the cavalry attack and thwart any attempt to counter-attack by Meade. They could also likely be able to interdict any supply wagons that were moving north to support the Union line.

Meanwhile, Lee acquiesced to Stuart’s request to lead a cavalry assault. While the bulk of his cavalry division would mount a diversionary attack on the Union right flank, Stuart would lead a brigade around Manchester and past Westminster. Their objective would be the rail line. Once found, they would attempt to sever that supply link by burning bridges. An added bonus would be that they could cut the telegraph lines that always paralleled the railway.

Lee knew that he was in a rather precarious position deep in enemy territory. His access to supplies was limited. He had already ordered his vast array of wagons to muster at Taneytown using two routes to lessen congestion. Vital supplies like ammunition and medical items would travel the shorter route directly to Taneytown. The remainder of the wagons would arrive via Emmittsburg. Even so, the Army of Northern Virginia would be a rather isolated island of Rebel territory facing off with the Army of the Potomac. He needed to level the playing field by trying to deprive Meade of a free-flowing line of supplies.

As attractive as it might have been and a magnificent sight to behold, Lee knew that he could not send his entire 100,000 man army into one pitched battle with Meade. With the memory of Fredericksburg still fresh in his mind, he could not send one wave crashing into the Pipe Creek bluffs. He’d have to settle for harassing and chipping away at the Union defenses. But mainly he needed to divert their attention from their left flank to allow Longstreet to succeed. If McLaws could establish himself in Westminster, Longstreet could then pull Hood closer in and establish a salient in the Union rear area. They’d have to feed off Union supplies and had little chance of being re-enforced. But if Meade weakened his line by pulling troops to counter-attack Longstreet, Lee had a greater chance of breaching the Union line.

So the plan of attack for the 4th of July was this: Stuart’s cavalry would lead off with an attack near Union Mills — while Stuart himself slipped south around Manchester.

Lee wasn’t sure precisely which Union units were astride the Taneytown Road but they would be the focus of his frontal attack. That highway was to the center of his two infantry corps. Standing against them was the Union Eleventh Corps with the First Corps on their left and linking to Sickles on the far left flank. Of all of the Union Corps, the Eleventh had the worst reputation and was most likely to falter under attack, but Lee could not know that they were blocking his way to Westminster. Once the cavalry was engaged on the left flank, the two divisions directly straddling the Taneytown road — Anderson’s and Rodes’ — would move to attack the bluffs near the stone bridge.

But first, Lee had a surprise in store for Meade. Throughout the day of July third. Lee had positioned every available cannon on the hills facing the Union line. Even as the cavalry was attacking at Union Mills, they would begin the largest and most intense artillery bombardment ever to take place in the Western Hemisphere! Lee ordered his artillery chief to first target the Union artillery which was unseen but surely just behind the Union infantry. They would then shift their aim slightly to target the infantry fortifications all along the line from Union Mills (the point of crossing of the BALTO PIKE) to past the Taneytown Road. This would keep Meade guessing as to just where the frontal attack would be launched. It added one additional layer to keep Meade’s attention focused north and away from the Middleburg flank.

Unlike the actual battle at Gettysburg where Union occupied rather narrow hilltops and the artillery was interspersed with the infantry and in plain sight, for the most part the Union cannons at Pipe Creek were behind the infantry and out of direct sightline of the Rebels. Unfortunately for Lee, the problem with the artillery fuses was still present and still unrecognized. Even though the gunnery captains had rather accurately estimated the range to fire upon the Union artillery, the faulty fuses had them overshooting their intended target. But that also meant that fused rounds fired at the infantry were falling on the Union cannon crews. Because they were firing at fortifications, when the artillery shifted to fire on the Union infantry they also switched to more solid shot and fewer fused rounds. All in, this bombardment was somewhat more effective than that used to prepare for Pickett’s actual attack at Gettysburg. One problem was that Lee’s 120 or so guns were dispersed over a much greater area and were unable to concentrate their fire. At the same time, the counter-battery fire from the Union guns was also more dispersed and less effective. Lee ordered his artillery commander to expend all the available ammunition, knowing that more was en route from Cashtown via the supply trains.

Unfortunately, Lee had no direct communication with Longstreet to coordinate his attack. The best they could do was to have Hood initiate the attack to cover McLaws’ movement as the Rebel artillery to the north fell silent. There was no doubt that the bombardment would be heard as it would rattle widows in the southern part of Westminster.

Also the adage that no plan survives first contact with the enemy proved at least partially true for Longstreet. What they failed to anticipate was Sickles’ possession of the siege guns. Sickles had placed scouts at the edge of the range of these cannons. When they spotted the Rebels advancing, they reported back and the artillery captain estimated his range. Although they were cumbersome and slow to load and fire, rounds falling on the Rebels long before they were within sight of Middleburg was baffling to Hood. The Union artillery captain had skillfully targeted those 3 guns on the roadway — much as Buford had done on the actual Day 1 at Gettysburg. Hood was still in marching formation when those first rounds impacted the road in and around him. With nothing to guide him, the siege gun captain was simply guessing where to aim and lessening the powder charges with each volley to lessen the range.

Hood initialed ordered a halt to his advance and sent word back to Longstreet that he was under artillery fire. It was evident to all concerned that these were not your standard artillery shells. The range and size of the explosions were evidence enough. After an initial period of confusion and observation of the pattern of the explosions, Longstreet had Hood re-deploy into an attack formation and to advance quickly in an attempt to race ahead of the artillery as the shells hit closer and closer to the Union line. Once Hood’s lead elements came with range of the Union line, the siege guns were no longer effective at that shorter range and their use was abandoned. But they had had the effect of startling both Hood and Longstreet and slightly delaying his attack.

Longstreet had communicated his expect arrival time at Middleburg and he was only slightly behind schedule. As the Rebel guns fell silent, Anderson’s and Rodes’ divisions emerged from the tree line and began they advance into the no-man’s-land. Long-range Union artillery fire immediately began, but because of the length of the Union line this fire too was much less concentrated than had often occurred in prior battles. It was certainly much less intense than that leveled on Pickett in the actual battle. Two full divisions, about 10,000 men in all were arrayed in two echelons, two brigades leading and one in trail, marching across relatively flat land that the Union gun captains had carefully surveyed. Even so, the attack picked up pace and advanced with relatively few casualties. To add another layer of diversion, the two divisions of troops next to those advancing, emerged from the tree line as if in preparation for the attack, but Lee had no intention of committing them. They were there for show and to draw away some of the long range artillery fire.

ALT HX #3d Lee attacks Westminster

As per usual, Stuart’s cavalry was the first to strike. They cut the telegraph lines to Baltimore and burned two small bridges that effectively severed the rail connection. Not being quite satisfied with those accomplishments, Stuart led his brigade into the southeast corner of Westminster. As was to be the case for McLaws, he met no Union resistance. But he found little of value to destroy or pillage. Instead he decided to join the fun on the other side of town. He rode south and around the west side of the city. He managed to join up with the ensemble of cavalry that had been assigned to McLaws. He immediately assumed command of the combined force and led them to find the railway station by riding towards the center of the city. Sure enough, he stumbled upon 4 locomotives that were in the loop to return to Baltimore. The Union soldiers unloading and sorting supplies scattered at the sight of pistol and sword wielding crazed rebel cavalrymen. A few well-placed rifle shots and the boilers of the engines were promptly disabled. This had the effect of sealing the station even if the rails themselves could be repaired. Nothing could arrive to be easily offloaded until these 4 were cleared away. Some black powder finished the job of destroying them.

Next, he turned his attention to the cache of supplies. The Union logisticians had hastily built a large go-dong to protect the black powder from the elements. He directed that any ammunition still loaded in wagons should be seized and driven out of town. He then set fire to the go-dong. The ensuing explosion would destroy not only the powder but everything else in the vicinity. It would also grab the attention of Meade’s command staff! By this time, the lead elements of McLaws’ infantry arrived. Stuart warned them to fall back to avoid the impending explosion. He then remounted his troopers with the intent of finding any wagons that were headed north and seizing them. He met up with MG McLaws en route to the burning city with a dozen wagons of supplies, mostly black powder. They exchanged greetings as he passed to deliver his bounty to LTG Longstreet. A huge column of black smoke marked the success of his escapade!

Back in Middleburg, Sickles’ men were holding their own against the feint attacks by Hood. Hood’s orders were to pin them down, not overrun them. They just needed to be held in place so they could not counter McLaws’ advance. Stuart considered making an attack into Middleburg as he retraced McLaws’ path but decided to seek Longstreet’s praise by making a gift of his loot and not risk losing it in the attack. Longstreet was a bit amazed and dismayed that Stuart had ridden completely around the rear of the Union force and was now showing up some 20 miles from where he started, towing a bounty of supplies. Stuart pointed back to the column of smoke from the burning city and supplies and claimed credit for all!

Farther north, along the Taneytown Road, things weren’t going quite as well for the Rebel infantry. Overall, in their 20 minute advance to Pipe’s Creek, their losses had been acceptably light. But now they were confronted with the creek’s gorge. For the last 100 yards or so of their approach, they had come under intense volley fire from the Union ramparts above. Then BG Hunt’s artillery plan came into play. He had positioned the guns and preplanned their firing such that they were rotated a few degrees and could fire laterally into the infantry at the base of the hills. The close-in, anti-infantry canister shot was incredibly accurate! With nothing to use for cover, most men simply jumped into the creek to seek the protection of the walls of dirt and stone.

Meade, however, had placed another surprise in their path. Hidden midway up the bluffs were sharpshooters and small cannons. At close range, the combined effects of this small force was devastating. The sharpshooters targeted anyone on horseback at over 100 yards. Company and brigade commanders were brought down. The cannons firing grape shot mowed down men like a scythe. Though small and few in number, they had a disproportionate effect. As the Rebels advanced to the edge of the creek bed and the larger Union artillery repositioned to lay down fire, the sharpshooters and artillerymen retreated up the slope. They were confident that having been abandoned, those cannons were incapable of being redirected at the Union troops.

The surviving Rebel leaders realized that pressing the attack up the slope was futile. They ordered a general withdrawal. But they had accomplished the mission of pinning down the Union troops — the First and Eleventh Corps — so that they could not shift to assist Sickles’ on their flank nor counter McLaws’ attack.

On the left flank, BG Birney’s men bore the brunt of Hood’s attack. They were holding well behind their makeshift ramparts until Hood was able to bring to bear his artillery. Actually, he had double the artillery strength. McLaws’s artillery batteries had been left under his command to speed McLaws’ advance. Every available type of ammunition began to rain in on the Birney’s barricades. Solid shot was particularly devastating as it hit the over-turned wagons sending wood and metal fragments in all directions. As casualties mounted, Birney was forced to call for re-enforcements from Hancock’s reserve division. One brigade was dispatched but arrived just as the attack was withering as darkness fell.

Further north, the two divisions were also withdrawing across the mile wide plain under cover of the deepening darkness. The Union artillery with a seemingly unlimited supply of ammunition continued to toss shells at them but to little real effect. Once night fell fully on the battlefield the huge fire in Westminster was even more visible and foreboding.

MG McLaws’ division had established itself in the northwest corner of the city and settled in for the night feasting on Union rations. MG Hood sent his reserve brigade to re-enforce and extent the Rebel hold in the Union rear.

Meade’s men climbed out of their trenches and began to wonder where their food and ammunition would come from; much of it in Westminster was now either gone or in Rebel hands.

ALT HX #3e The face-off to the end

Five July dawned with no real plan of action on either side. Meade was content to await Lee’s next move and to try to ascertain the effects of the attack on his supplies. For his part, too, Lee was content with letting Meade dictate the next move. Would Meade attack him across the plain? Unlikely. Would he counter-attack to try to dislodge Longstreet’s men in the city? That was a distinct possibility that Lee could do little to assist. His forces were just too far north. Stuart had decided on his own that he’d remain with Longstreet and provide a screening force to the north of the city.

Lee still had 5 divisions that had not yet engaged but he saw no benefit to another attack on the Pipe Creek bluffs. Yesterday’s attack had proven the depth and effectiveness of the Union defensive position and plan. The close-in artillery support was particularly effective in stopping his men at the creek bed. They reported back no real hope of scaling the bluffs under intense fire from the defenders.

Meade was also content with assessing the situation. Although he had been deprived of huge amounts of ammunition and powder, his logisticians had stockpiled considerable quantities close to his forward line so he was not in desperate straits. Food was a different matter. Much of that was not either gone or in the hands of the Rebels; likewise medical supplies. His hospital units were close in near Frizzelburg, but they would need re-supply soon.

His course of action seemed clear. He had to regain control of Westminster and re-establish his supply line to Baltimore. He’d leave the repair of the rail line to the rail crews. As the next train from Baltimore encountered the disrupted line, they would telegraph for repair crews to move up and rebuild the bridges. This time the ones closest to Westminster would be guarded. Meade ordered Hancock to oust the Rebels from the city. Reports were that it was a substantial but limited force. Also he, too, could read a map and see that they had no visible means of support or re-enforcement.

Hancock assembled his Corps and moved towards Westminster. To assist him Sickles shifted his siege guns closer to the city and began a slow but persistent bombardment. Hancock’s lead element clashed with Stuart’s cavalry outside the city but were able to flank and nearly envelope that small force and Stuart was forced to withdraw into the city. Next, Hancock brought up his artillery and having reconnoitered the Rebel line, began to bombard it at close range. He counter-attacked with a three-pronged advance. One division attacked from the north. His second moved into the city and started a house to house campaign to push the Rebels out. The third division shifted west as a blocking force and anvil against which the Rebels would be smashed.

It took a few days, but by July 8 the Rebel resistance was faltering. As they were pushed out of the city into the open country, that third division attacked them and finally forced both McLaws’ division and Hood’s brigade to surrender. Riding with Stuart’s cavalry as body guards, Longstreet had managed to escape, dragging Hood with him under protest. But the three of them would live to fight another day.

As Longstreet reported back to Lee at his Taneytown HQ, the senior commanders acquiesced that there was little more they could hope for. Between the KIAs, WIAs and POWs, Lee had lost one-third of his Army. Meade had paid a much lower price in his defense of Westminster.

Under the cover of darkness, on the evening of 10 July, Lee began the slow withdrawal of his army back to Virginia via Mechanicstown. He had suffered not so much of an out-right military defeat as a humiliation at the hands of the Army of the Potomac, but the Army of Northern Virginia would soon be fighting again on its home turf.