ALT HX #4: Day 2 w/o Sickles Salient
This WHATIF postulates what Day 2 of the engagement may have looked like if Sickles had not shifted his Third Corps forward into the path of Longstreet’s planned offensive.
On July 2, 1863 when Lee ordered Longstreet to carry out an attack on the Union left flank, it seems that Lee was convinced that the Union line would be found running parallel to the Emmittsburg Road. For someone who was staking his reputation and the fate of his army on his tactics, he seemed to do little to verify his assumption of the Union position. We know from MG Birney’s reported to LTG Sickles that MG Anderson’s Division of LTG Hill’s Corps were bivouacked on the east slope of Seminary Ridge with at least one brigade operating near the south end opposite the Peach Orchard. Seemingly, any of the officers in that division could have clearly observed the lack of Union activity along the roadway and that the Union troops were actually massed on Cemetery Ridge. But there would have been no reason to make such a negative report, unless they were aware of Longstreet’s attack plan and path.
This is perhaps another instance where Lee’s command philosophy failed him. It is not clear if LTG Hill was aware of the attack orders given to Longstreet that morning. Seemingly, if he knew of the attack’s path, he would have had Anderson scout for activity. But no such report reached Lee or Longstreet. Two of Longstreet’s divisions were on the way to attack a non-existent Union force. Why Lee was so confident of his assumption — seemingly without having the area scouted — is confounding to say the least. As the battle actually unfolded that day, Lee’s plan was unimportant because he had no way of knowing what Sickles had done. MG Birney’s men had made contact with elements of Anderson’s division on the slope of Seminary Ridge, but seemingly this encounter too was not reported back to Lee — at least not in a timely manner.
For his own part, Longstreet also seemingly took no action to verify the objective of his attack. He may not have been aware of Anderson’s presence on the slope since Anderson answered to LTG Hill not Longstreet. But Longstreet could have independently sent an officer to the Seminary’s cupola to view the roadway to the south. He did not.
Granted Longstreet was busy throughout the morning preparing for his movement to contact. He sent scouts to the south who reported on the presence of the Union Signal Unit on Little Round Top (LRT) and caused him to re-route his path to mask his movement. All of this took time, hence MG McLaws’ Division didn’t arrive at the start point of the attack until nearly 4 P.M. IOW, Longstreet had had ample time to reconnoiter the placement of the enemy.
We also know that Longstreet was in a pique over Lee’s refusal to entertain his suggestion to maneuver south and attack any Union forces still moving towards Gettysburg. Perhaps this at least partially explains his deference to Lee’s orders without verifying a vital ingredient = the exact location of the Union force. He was blindly following orders and going in blind to where he was headed.
So we know for a fact that McLaws’ division rounded the south end of Seminary Ridge just before 4 P.M. If in accordance with the WHATIF that Sickles had followed orders and remained deployed along LRT, McLaws’ would have initially been hidden from the Union line behind the knoll that held the Peach Orchard. McLaws would have realigned his troops into an attack formation and marched north IAW Lee’s orders. Let’s begin by assuming that Longstreet had been made aware by McLaws that there was no significant Union forced deployed along the Emmittsburg Road; there were only skirmishers. Longstreet would have had time to re-direct his two divisions.
He could have — with or without Lee’s permission — stayed farther to the west away from Seminary Ridge and marched them south then east in search of Union forces. Such a movement would have taken him across the three major roads from the south. First was the Emmittsburg Road then Taneytown Road and finally the Baltimore Pike. All three of these had been used by Union formations to consolidate on the defensive position. But — unbeknownst to Longstreet — the only unit still en route was the Sixth Corps who was approaching from the east and would use the Pike for the last part of their journey only. They arrived at Gettysburg late in the afternoon or early evening of Day 2. Such a long sweeping march by Longstreet would very likely have only resulted in tired marchers and would not have encountered any Union troop formations. He would have had to move cautiously, since he could not be sure that they were no Union troops on any of those three major by-ways approaching from the south. The last thing he needed was for one of them to cross his rear and cut off his return path. By nightfall, he would likely have been in the vicinity of the Baltimore Pike, but would have found nothing more than logistics wagons moving along it. He could not afford to remain isolated to the south so he would have had to backtrack and return to his starting point with a very weary bunch of soldiers. But this is probably the least likely alternate history possibility.
More likely, Longstreet would have done exactly what Sickles is said to have feared. McLaws would have moved up into the Peach Orchard and positioned his artillery there. At over a half-mile distance, they would have been out of effective rifle range from the Union line. But in doing so McLaws could have established a firm anchor point as the Rebel army’s right flank. Since Lee was spoiling for a fight, Longstreet would then have provided one by having Hood attack through the area known as the wheat field towards Devil’s Den and LRT. McLaws could have supported him with artillery and possibly even an infantry attack. But McLaws’ soldiers would have been crossing a half-mile of open ground in full range of the Union guns on Cemetery Ridge and LRT.
In something of a rehearsal for Pickett’s Charge, it is even possible that Anderson’s division could have moved off the slope and joined the attack, much as they did in the late afternoon of the actual Day 2.
In the real Day 2 battle, COL Strong Vincent’s Brigade of the Union Fifth Corps (which included the 20th Maine Rgt) was just barely able to deploy along the south end of LRT in time to meet Hood’s attack. If Sickles had performed as ordered, his two divisions would have likely been thinly deployed along LRT with the Fifth Corps just moving in to his rear to provide reinforcements.
It is fair to speculate, however, that the attacks up the southernmost slope of LRT that LTC Chamberlain held and then repelled, MIGHT have been more successful against whatever regiment of Sickles’ Corps was in that same position. Since it was a bit isolated and faced south rather than west it is even possible that none of Sickles’ men would have actually occupied that patch of woods and that the 4th Alabama and 5th Texas regiments that actually attacked the 20th Maine might have found their path undefended enabling them to move into the rear area of the Third Corps. Even if they have been successful, it is doubtful that Hood would have known about their success in time to shift troops to exploit it.
As in the actual Day 2, it is doubtful that Hood’s attacks against the west facing portion of LRT would have been any more successful had he been attacking Sickles’ Corps instead of elements of the Fifth Corps. Even with McLaws attacking on his left and Anderson farther north, it is hard to concoct a scenario when these combined Rebel attacks would be more successful than they actually were.
Just about the only vindication in this alternative history would be validation of Sickles’ dread of having Confederate artillery facing him from the Peach Orchard. But while they were not perched on that knoll, there was no dearth of Rebel artillery support on the real Day 2 so having them in the orchard was not likely to have been a decisive change.
So, no matter how many ways we change the pattern of the Day 2 attack, it is highly unlikely that the outcome would have been significantly altered. By the end of the actual Day 2, Rebel troops occupied the Peach Orchard. Had they occupied it earlier, and with less bloodshed, it is doubtful that they would have played a significant role in the outcome of the battle.
We are still left to wonder about the method in which Lee made major decisions about how to employ his army. On Day 2, he sent them off to attack a non-existent Union formation and on Day 3 he seemingly had no plan for how he would exploit a successful attack by Pickett.
