Was Lee doomed from the start?
In the first few ALTERNATE HISTORY essays, I have explored (speculated) as to how Lee’s Army could have fared better at Gettysburg. It seems to me, however, that he was ultimately doomed from the start.
Blind to the Union movements to the north, without Stuart’s Cavalry to scout for them, the Rebels stumbled into Buford’s ambush and things went downhill from there. It seems that repeatedly throughout the three days, the timely arrival of troops at a particular place changed the outcome of the battle for both sides. The first instance was the arrival of Early’s Division from the east just as the Eleventh Corps was moving into place. Had he not arrived at that precise moment, had they had time to establish themselves in a defensive line, the outcome of Day 1 could have been different. The Union line might have held and undertaken an orderly withdrawal to the cemetery under cover of darkness.
Perhaps Lee should have accepted his fate as soon as he viewed the series of hills from the cupola of the Seminary late in the afternoon of Day 1. But did he really have a choice? Could he have withdrawn, broken contact and redirected his force in a new direction? Given his objective to secure a political, if not a military, victory on Northern soil, he was seemingly forced to stay and fight on the ground that the Union had chosen.
Once he massed his troops at Gettysburg, he had few other options than to fight there. As they moved in from the west, they were not in a good position to march against the converging Union forces who were mainly moving from the south. Despite Longstreet’s urging to shift southeast and attack the marching formations, there was little hope that such a move could have been successfully carried out. It would have taken the Rebel forces too long to move in that direction; the Union forces were practically all in place before Longstreet could have moved to find them en route. Plus such a tactic would have split Lee’s army, a move he was loathe to make.
West Pointers all study military history. I can only imagine that as Lee stood in the Seminary cupola on Day 1 and viewed the terrain that the Union was occupying, he must have felt like hundreds of military commanders before him whose enemy was manning the castle walls. But Lee didn’t have the option of laying siege to those hills. He had nowhere near the number of troops that it would have taken to surround the ‘castle’. Meade had an open and straight path to bring supplies and troops up from Westminster and Lee couldn’t prevent that. Plus Lee was operating deep in enemy territory. He was pillaging the surrounding area for food and basic supplies but he had severe limits on the other military supplies in his logistical train — chiefly ammunition. A protracted siege-like encounter was out of the question. Whatever happened needed to be decided in a matter of days.
Launching the flank attack on Day 2 was probably the best option Lee had at the time. But why he didn’t do a better job of scouting precisely where the Union line was is unfathomable. He had nearly 8 hours from the time he ordered the attack until its initiation. How is it even possible that no one knew that he had sent them to attack a non-existent Union line? His assumption that the Union was massed along the Emmittsburg Road could have been verified (or dismissed) in a number of ways. MG Anderson could have been directed to scout that terrain. Even a casual observer in the seminary cupola could have seen the lack of activity along the road and the active construction of breastworks along the ridge running south from the cemetery. But Lee never asked anyone to verify his assumption!
Towards the end of Day 2, the battle was still undecided. Sickles’ troops in the Peach Orchard were being routed. Anderson launched a supporting attack to the north of McLaws. But here, too, was another unfortunate event — one could possibly even call it a blunder — for the Rebels. Anderson attacked straight east from Seminary Ridge covering much the same ground that Pickett would cross on Day 3. No one seemed to recognize that there was a half-mile wide gap in the Union line between the Peach Orchard and the southern tip of Cemetery Ridge. It wouldn’t have exactly been an unopposed path, but it certainly might have added to the chaos of Sickles’ retreat if Rebel forces suddenly attacked from the north. Such an attack would have also placed them the rear of Birney’s southern facing Division and the troops sent to reinforce him. They could have been trapped in a vice! But there was no luck to be had by Lee on that day either.
One has to remember that early on Day 1, just as Reynolds’ First Corps was arriving on the battle front, a Rebel brigade wheeled south and nearly penetrated behind the Iron Brigade, but they were stopped by the unfinished railway ditch and that ended the threat. Anderson could have pulled off a similar move and routed the Union troops in the salient.
By Day 3 Lee’s back was truly against the wall. He had only one unbloodied division: Pickett’s. But once again, Lee’s assumption that Meade would have reinforced his flanks at the expense of his middle proved false. Perhaps the most brilliant tactic Lee concocted in his long and successful military career was the huge artillery barrage on Day 3. But once again, luck was not on his side. Because of the defective fuses, both that barrage and the follow-on infantry attack were an unmitigated disaster.
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If we reduce Lee’s options at the end of Day 1 to the four points on a compass, he chose to stay in place and attack to the EAST. Another choice would have been to continue to move NORTH. Ewell’s Corps was still largely to the north and could have been the vanguard of an attack towards Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania state capital. But that would have pushed Lee deeper into enemy territory with 100,000 Union soldiers to his rear; not a viable option.
That leaves SOUTH or WEST. WEST would have been a simple retreat across the path that Lee had used to reach Gettysburg. This would have been an outright admission of the failure of his basic “move north and win” strategy and it would have been a morale buster to ask his troops to retreat without a meaningful fight.
A quick look at the map shows that SOUTH might actually have been a viable option. The most important cities immediately south of Gettysburg are Emmittsburg and Taneytown with Westminster just a few miles farther south. Such a move would have been a variation of what Longstreet had been urging. It could have placed the Union force in a disadvantageous position of being too far north and Lee would have had a chance to interdict the vital supply routes to Gettysburg. Had Lee been able to quickly maneuver his army into a blocking position in and around Taneytown (much in reverse of the way GEN Hooker had envisioned the battle), he might possibly have forced the political victory that he was seeking.
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In those previous ALTERRNATE HISTORY essays, I have explored the ways that Lee might have found more success in this battle. But time and time again, the scenarios do not seem to work out in his favor. Even if the Rebels were granted certain ‘advantages’ — such as Sickles not having formed the salient that blocked Longstreet’s attack — the outcome of the subsequent battle seems to turn against the Rebels. Perhaps the most damning indictment of Lee’s strategy is what appears to be a total lack of a plan to exploit the breach if Pickett (due to a successful artillery attack) had had a successful attack on the Union Second Corps. In that case, even success was seemingly doomed to failure!